I really enjoyed this book - it lacked the novelty of Smith's earlier work on England vs Vichy France but remains gripping reading, although hard to take at times if you're an Aussie. Australians are brought up on the story of British incompetence at Singapore - guns facing the wrong way, refusal to build defences, and so on. But it seems fairly clear a big reason behind the disaster of the campaign was Australian troops cracking under pressure, particularly on the battle on Singapore Island itself.
It wasn't the only one of course; from reading this the key mistakes appear to have been:
1) Failure to launch the pre-emptive strike Operation Matador which would have secured Thai beach heads and possibly meant the invasion fleet could have been sunk;
2) Failure of Admiral Tom Phillips to call in air support for Force Z even though the element of surprise had been lost;
3) The tendency of Allied forces to retreat rather than make a stand;
4) Failure to build defences on Singapore on the north shore;
5) Inadequate preparation for northern defences;
6) Bad leadership especially of Australians and Indians.
The campaign wasn't a complete disaster for the Allies - they managed to inflict some bloody noses on the Japanese - but they lost all the key battles. We should be grown up enough as a nation to consistently study this campaign and learn from it instead of seeking solace in myth.
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